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WILL TARASOFF LIABILITY BE EXTENDED TO
ATTORNEYS IN LIGHT OF NEW CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 956.5?
Jeffrey P. Kerrane*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tanya Tarasoff met Prosenjit Poddar while taking folk
dancing classes at the University of California, Berkeley's In-
ternational House dormitory in 1968.1 On New Year's Eve,
they kissed.2 Prosenjit interpreted the kiss as the beginning
of a serious relationship.3 Shortly thereafter, however,
Tanya told Prosenjit that she was not interested in an inti-
mate relationship.4 Prosenjit, thrown into a severe emotional
crisis,5 began to stalk Tanya.6 On the occasions when they
met, Prosenjit tape recorded their conversations in order to
ascertain why she did not love him.7
During the summer of 1969, Tanya went to Brazil, and
Prosenjit began seeing a clinical psychologist.8 On August
18, 1969, Prosenjit told his psychologist, Dr. Moore, that he
intended to kill Tanya when she returned home to Berkeley.
9
Dr. Moore sent a letter to campus police, notifying them that
Prosenjit was "a danger to the welfare of other people and
himself."10 Campus police temporarily took Prosenjit into
custody, but released him after being convinced that he
would stay away from Tanya." When Tanya returned from
Brazil, neither Dr. Moore nor the campus police made any
* J.D., 1994, University of San Diego; B.A., 1991, University of California,
Los Angeles.
1. People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 344 (Cal. 1974).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 345 (Cal. 1974).
7. Id. at 344.
8. Id.
9. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 555 (Cal. 1974).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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effort to warn her of Prosenjit's stated intentions. 12 On Octo-
ber 27, 1969, Prosenjit went to Tanya's home and asked to
speak to her. 13  She refused, and began to scream. 14
Prosenjit shot her with a pellet gun, pursued her as she ran
from the house, then stabbed her to death. 15
Tanya Tarasoff's parents sued the psychologist, among
others, for the wrongful death of their daughter. 16 It was in
this case, Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,'v
that the California Supreme Court held, "[wihen a therapist
determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession
should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger
of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reason-
able care to protect the intended victim against such
danger."' 8
From then on, California psychotherapists had a civil ob-
ligation to take reasonable steps to protect the general public
from the violent acts of their patients. This obligation is a
reflection of the court's attempt to balance public safety inter-
ests with the need for confidentiality in psychotherapist-pa-
tient communications.' 9 At least in cases of threatened vio-
lent assault, the court has determined that the interest in
public safety is supreme.2 °
The Tarasoff decision, perhaps not coincidentally, does
not mention the attorney-client relationship. 2' After all,
Tarasoffs keystone is California Evidence Code section 1024,
which provides an exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege when the psychotherapist has reason to believe the
patient may be dangerous. 22 At the time, there was no corre-
sponding exception to the attorney-client privilege. Califor-
nia has traditionally been the state most protective of the
12. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 555 (Cal. 1974).
13. People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 345 (Cal. 1974).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. 878, 881 (1973).
17. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
18. Id. at 340.
19. Id. at 346-47.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. California Evidence Code section 1024 states: "[t]here is no privilege...
if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such
mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or
property of another and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to
prevent the threatened danger." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (Deering 1986).
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confidential relationship between attorneys and their cli-
ents.23 California Business and Professions Code section
6068(e) states that it is the duty of an attorney to "maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or her-
self to preserve the secrets, of his or her client."24 This statu-
tory language appears to leave no room for exceptions.25
All this may have changed on January 1, 1994, when
California Evidence Code section 956.5 took effect, creating a
new exception to the attorney-client privilege. 26 The new sec-
tion provides: "[there is no privilege under this article if the
lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential
communication relating to representation of a client is neces-
sary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm."27
With this new exception in place, it is probable that the
California Supreme Court will reexamine the Tarasoff deci-
sion, expanding its scope to include the attorney-client
relationship.2 8
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE V. THE ATTORNEY'S
DuTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence found
in California Evidence Code section 954.29 It protects private
23. See San Diego County Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 1 (1990-1); STE-
PHEN GILLERS & NORMAN DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND ETHICS 20 (1990).
24. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (Deering 1993).
25. See San Diego County Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 1 (1990-1); see also
GILLERS & DORSEN, supra note 23 at 20.
26. CAL. EVID. CODE § 956.5 (Deering Supp. 1995).
27. Id.
28. Public defenders and other government-employed attorneys will not be
protected by governmental immunity in this case. Government Code section
820.2 declares that "a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from
his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of
the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion [was] abused."
CAL. GOvT. CODE § 820.2 (Deering 1982). The court in Tarasoff addressed this
provision, stating that it provides immunity for only "basic policy decisions."
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 349 (Cal. 1976). On this
ground, the court refused to extend governmental immunity to protect Dr.
Moore, a state-employed psychologist, from liability for his failure to warn
Tanya Tarasoff. Id. at 349-50. It therefore follows that if Tarasoff liability is
extended to include attorneys, then public defenders and other government-em-
ployed attorneys will enjoy no governmental immunity.
29. California Evidence Code section 954 provides in pertinent part:
1995]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
communications between the client and the lawyer in the
course of the attorney-client relationship, and in furtherance
of the client's interests.3 0 The attorney's duty of confidential-
ity31 is broader. It ethically prohibits an attorney from re-
vealing her or his client's secrets to any unauthorized party
regardless of how the attorney learned the secret.3 2
Does an exception to the attorney-client privilege create
a corresponding exception to the attorney's ethical duty of
confidentiality? Generally, the answer to this question is no.
Although there is a distinct lack of California case law ad-
dressing this question, courts in other jurisdictions have held
that an exception to the attorney-client privilege is not neces-
sarily an exception to the attorney's ethical duty.3 3 In Bren-
nan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants,34 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated:
[T]he ethical duty is broader than the evidentiary privi-
lege: "This ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privi-
lege, exists without regard to the nature or source of infor-
mation or the fact that others share the knowledge. A
lawyer should not use information acquired in the course
Subject to section 912 and except as otherwise provided in this article,
the client, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication
between client and lawyer if the privilege is claimed by:
(a) The holder of the privilege;
(b) A person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of
the privilege; or
(c) The person who was the lawyer at the time of the confidential com-
munication, but such person may not claim the privilege if there is no
holder of the privilege in existence or if he is otherwise instructed by a
person authorized to permit disclosure.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (Deering Supp. 1995).
30. California Evidence Code section 952 states:
As used in this article, "confidential communication between client and
lawyer" means information transmitted between a client and his or her
lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means
which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no
third persons other than those who are present to further the interest
of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reason-
ably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accom-
plishment of the purpose for which the lawyer in consulted, and in-
cludes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in the
course of that relationship.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (Deering Supp. 1995). See also infra note 67.
31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
34. 590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979).
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of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the
client ....... Information so acquired is sheltered from
use by the attorney against his client by virtue of the
existence of the attorney-client relationship.
35
Conversely, an exception to the ethical duty is not neces-
sarily an exception to the privilege. In Kleinfield v. State,36 a
client made a statement to his counsel implicating himself in
a past homicide and threatening future violence.
3 7 The court
held that the statement remained privileged although the at-
torney had the authority to reveal it under Florida's ethics
rules.38
On the other hand, the legislative history of the new ex-
ception seems to suggest the California Legislature's intent
to create an exception to the privilege as well as an exception
to the ethical duty.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
On June 3, 1993, the California Supreme Court rejected
for the second time the State Bar's Proposed Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 3-100 ("Proposed Rule 3-100"),"9 which would
have created an exception to the attorney-client ethical duty
of confidentiality.40 The rule would have permitted an attor-
35. Id. at 172. (quoting ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 4-4
(1970))(citation omitted) (elipsis within quotations in original).
36. 568 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 1990).
37. Id. at 939.
38. Id.
39. The proposed rule was originally sent to the California Supreme Court
for approval in December 1987. Letter from Board Committee on Admissions
and Competence to Members of the Board of Governors 1 (March 9, 1991) (on
file with the Santa Clara Law Review). The court returned the rule in June
1988 with an accompanying letter stating:
Regarding Proposed Rule 3-100(C)(3) (Duty to Maintain Client Confi-
dence and Secrets Inviolate), in what context does it allow for disclo-
sure of otherwise privileged attorney-client information? To the extent
it permits disclosure in a judicial proceeding where no statutory excep-
tion to the privilege exists, it may be inconsistent with, or contravene
the Legislature's intent underlying Evidence Code section 950 et seq.
(Cf. Pitches v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 531, 539-540). Where
the Legislature has codified, and revised, or supplanted privileges pre-
viously available at common law, does the court have inherent author-
ity to modify this statutory privilege?
Id. at 1-2.
The court was concerned with the potential conflict between an attorney's
ethical duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. The court ques-
tioned its authority to modify the legislatively created attorney-client privilege.
40. Proposed Rule of Professional Conduct 3-100 stated in pertinent part:
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ney to reveal a confidence "to prevent the commission of a
criminal act that the member believes is likely to result in
death or bodily harm."41 The proposed rule would not, how-
ever, have created an affirmative duty on the attorney to re-
veal any confidences.42 According to the State Bar, the rule
also would have had no effect on the attorney-client privi-
lege.43 The California Supreme Court rejected this rule the
second time without comment.4
In response to the heated debate over amending the Cali-
fornia Rules of Professional Conduct, State Senator Robert
Presley amended Senate Bill 645 ("S.B. 645"), his attorney
discipline bill,45 to include new Evidence Code section
956.5.46 When the bill became law, it effected a change in the
attorney-client relationship perhaps more profound than was
originally intended by the State Bar with its Proposed Rule
3-100.4 7 Evidence Code section 956.5 does not give attorneys
(C) A member may reveal a confidence or secret:
(3) To the extent the member reasonably believes necessary;
(a) to prevent the commission of a criminal act that the
member believes is likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm,
CAL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-100 (Proposed Official Draft
(1987) [hereinafter Proposed Rule 3-100].
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. The State Bar attached the following paragraph to the end of the dis-
cussion section to Proposed Rule 3-100:
This rule is not intended to create, augment, diminish, or eliminate
any application of either the lawyer-client privilege or the work prod-
uct rule. For example, a member making disclosure to the authorities
under paragraph (C)(3)(a) is not thereby waiving the lawyer-client
privilege because, presumably, the client would not have consented to
the disclosure. (Cf. Klang v. Shell Oil Company (1971) 17 Cal. App. 3d
933 [95 Cal.Rptr. 265]; See also concluding paragraph of rule 1-100(A).)
Id.
44. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT FOR 1993 CALIFORNIA
SENATE BILL 645, 1993-94 Regular Sess., at 12 (Aug. 18, 1993).
45. Id.
46. The amendment was suggested by a law student constituent of Pres-
ley's. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT FOR 1993 CALIFORNIA SEN-
ATE BILL 645, 1993-94 Regular Sess., at 14 (May 18, 1993).
47. An early Senate Committee report stated that the bill was enacted "for
the purpose of resolving a current lack of clarity." Id. at 24-25. The report
continued:
Under Evid. C. Sec. 956, there is no privilege if the services of an attor-
ney are sought to enable or aid in the commission of a criminal act.
This is not specifically on point as to disclosure of information regard-
ing a contemplated criminal act, though case law would indicate that
830 [Vol. 35
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discretion to disclose information to authorities when they
believe a client may commit a violent crime; rather, it allows
an attorney to be compelled to reveal such information in
court.48 Furthermore, it does not expressly create an excep-
tion to the attorney's duty of confidentiality found in Business
and Professions Code section 6068(e).49 Whether Evidence
Code section 956.5 implicitly creates an exception to the at-
torney's ethical duty of confidentiality remains to be seen.
Section 956.5 is an approximate parallel to the psycho-
therapist-patient exception found in section 1024. What does
this mean to California attorneys? Based upon the justifica-
tions for its holding in Tarasoff, the California Supreme
Court may no longer find a meaningful distinction between
the psychotherapist-patient and the attorney-client privilege.
This means that a client who tells his attorney that he is
about to commit a violent crime may force his attorney to
make a difficult decision. If the attorney remains silent and
the client follows through on his threat, the attorney may be
subject to Tarasoff liability. On the other hand, if the attor-
ney discloses what he knows to the authorities, a judge, or
the potential victim, the attorney may be subject to discipline
for violating his ethical duty of confidentiality found in Busi-
ness and Professions Code section 6068(e).
IV. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The court will likely consider whether the California Leg-
islature intended to impose Tarasoff liability on lawyers who
fail to disclose when they reasonably believe that a client may
such information is not privileged [Norwell v. Los Angeles County Su-
perior Court (1963) 223 Cal. App. 2d 652, Abbott v. Alameda County
Superior Court (1947) 78 Cal. App. 2d 19]. (emphasis added).
Id. at 25.
This report suggests that there was some original belief that the new evi-
dence code would merely codify existing law. However, a later report stated:
This provision of SB 645 appears to be a departure from existing law.
In People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583 (1990), the Court states that "[no]
express exception to the attorney-client privilege exists for threats of
future criminal conduct." SB 645 creates an express exception.
ASSEMBLY Comm. ON JUDICIARY, Comm. REPORT FOR 1993 CALIFORNIA SENATE
BILL 645, 1993-94 Regular Sess., at 17 (Aug. 18, 1993). The latter report is the
more factually correct of the two. The two cases cited in the earlier report were
cited for dicta which has been implicitly overruled by Clark. It appears that the
earlier report simply misstated the law.
48. See supra note 26.
49. See supra note 26.
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commit a violent crime. This analysis should consider
whether the Legislature intended to create an exception to
the attorney's duty of confidentiality. It seems unlikely that
the courts would impose Tarasoff liability on an attorney who
is bound by an ethical duty to maintain confidentiality de-
spite the likelihood that a client will cause death or substan-
tial bodily harm. The legislative history of S.B. 645, however,
suggests that it was, in fact, intended to impose Tarasoff lia-
bility on attorneys, and also, to create an exception to an at-
torney's ethical duty of confidentiality.5 0 When it was intro-
duced on March 2, 1993, S.B. 645 was simply an attorney
discipline bill.5' It made changes to the State Bar Court, the
Bar's Complainants' Grievance Panel, and several laws gov-
erning attorneys.52 On May 12, 1993, it was amended to cre-
ate new Evidence Code section 956.5.51 Originally, the sec-
tion required that the attorney believe the threatened death
or substantial bodily harm be "imminent."5 4 Later, the word
"imminent" was removed, 55 expanding the exception to in-
clude threats of even remote future crimes.56
50. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
51. S.B. 645, CALIFORNIA SENATE, 1993-94 Regular Sess., 1993 Cal. Laws,
as amended Mar. 2, 1993, at 37.
52. Id.
53. S.B. 645, CALIFORNIA SENATE, 1993-94 Regular Sess., 1993 Cal. Laws,
as amended May 12, 1993, at 30. The bill stated in pertinent part:
Section 956.5 is added to the evidence code, to read:
(A) There is no privilege under this article if the lawyer reasonably
believes that disclosure of any confidential communication relating to
representation of a client is necessary to prevent the client from com-
mitting a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm.
(B) A lawyer's decision not to take preventative action permitted by sub-
division (A) does not violate this section and shall not result in civil
liability.
Id. (emphasis added).
The emphasized portions were removed before the bill was signed by Gov-
ernor Wilson on October 9, 1993.
54. Id.
55. S.B. 645, CALIFORNIA SENATE, 1993-94 Regular Sess., 1993 Cal. Laws,
as amended Sept. 2, 1993, at 30.
56. Some scholars argue that because the new rule does not limit itself to
"imminent" criminal acts, even corporate lawyers may find themselves within
its reach.
Consider a business client who consults a lawyer about whether a pos-
sible concealed danger in a product or in the workplace must be re-
ported under Penal Code section 387 (the 'Be a Manager, Go to Jail'
law). Failure properly to report, warn or abate is a crime both on the
part of the manager and the corporation. If management fails to act in
832 [Vol. 35
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Perhaps most significantly for attorneys, the original ver-
sion contained a provision that specifically exempted attor-
neys who decide not to take preventative action from civil lia-
bility.57  Before the bill was signed, this provision was
removed, evidencing a clear legislative intent to impose civil
liability on attorneys who decide not to take preventative
action.58
An Assembly Committee report, dated only fifteen days
before the provision granting attorney immunity was deleted,
stated: "[t]his immunity clearly departs from the law that
governs psychotherapists under similar circumstances ....
It is not clear why attorneys should not be held to a similar
standard of conduct."
59
The language of this report, followed by the subsequent
removal of the immunity provision, suggests only one conclu-
sion. The Legislature rejected the notion that the distinction
between the psychotherapist-patient and the attorney-client
privilege warrants immunity for attorneys, but not for psy-
chotherapists. The Legislature made a conscious decision to
allow the Tarasoff liability to extend to attorneys.6 ° It is now
left to the courts to carry out the Legislature's intentions.
V. EXAMPLES
Before the enactment of section 956.5, California courts
and the San Diego County Bar Association issued opinions
concerning whether an attorney may disclose a client confi-
dence when the attorney has reason to believe the client will
corporate compliance with the statute, the consultation with the law-
yer is not privileged. It is discoverable in a products liability suit, a
workplace injury suit or in a criminal prosecution.
Moreover, the absence of the word imminent' from the statute im-
plicates harms which may not take place for generations. ABA Model
Rule 1.6 allows revelation of privileged information only to prevent
'mminent' death or bodily harm. Remember asbestos and DES? Now
is the temperature rising a bit in the boardroom?
Gerald F. Uelmen & Robert W. Peterson, Attorney-Client Dilemma, L.A. DAILY
J., Feb. 3, 1994, at 6.
57. See supra note 53.
58. S.B. 645, CALIFORNIA SENATE, 1993-94 Regular Sess., 1993 Cal. Laws,
as amended Sept. 2, 1993.
59. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT FOR 1993 CALIFORNIA
SENATE BILL 645, 1993-94 Regular Sess., (Aug. 18, 1993).
60. See supra notes. 57-59 and accompanying text.
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cause death or substantial bodily harm."1 In holding that an
attorney was prohibited from making such a disclosure, the
opinions cited the lack of an exception to the attorney-client
privilege in such cases.62 Now that such an exception exists,
these bodies will have to recognize that the previous distinc-
tion no longer exists in order to remain consistent with their
past opinions. Consequently, Tarasoff liability should be ex-
tended to attorneys.
A. San Diego County Bar Association Ethics Opinion
1990-1
The enactment of Evidence Code section 956.5 practically
eliminates the distinction between the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege and the attorney-client privilege in relation to
disclosure to prevent a client/patient from committing a
crime likely to result in death or bodily harm. In 1990, before
Evidence Code section 956.5 was enacted, the San Diego Bar
Association issued an ethics opinion distinguishing the two
privileges.68 The opinion states:
[Tihe analysis applied by the California Supreme Court
in Tarasoff is unavailable in the attorney-client relation-
ship. The Evidence Code codifies both the attorney-client
and the psychotherapist-patient privileges. See, Evidence
Code §§ 954, 1014. However, section 1024 also codifies
the "Tarasoff-exception" to the psychotherapist privilege.
Thus the existence of the Legislature's express exception
to the psychotherapist-patient privilege stands in contrast
to the absence of a similar exception to the attorney client
privilege.64
Read in light of the fact that the California Legislature
has now codified an exception to the attorney-client privilege,
which is similar to the pre-existing exception to the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, the opinion seems to suggest that
the "Tarasoff-exception" now exists for the attorney-client
privilege as well.
61. See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text
63. San Diego County Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 1 (1990-1).
64. Id. at 3.
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B. People v. Clark65
In a case decided prior to the enactment of Evidence
Code section 956.5, the California Supreme Court examined
the differences between the attorney-client privilege and the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 6 The court stated:
[t]he purpose underlying [the psychotherapist-patient
privilege] is not to prevent the use of defendant's state-
ments against him in legal proceedings. It exists to pre-
vent the unnecessary disclosure of statements made in con-
fidence in the course of privileged communication with a
therapist and thereby to facilitate treatment.
The attorney-client privilege serves a different pur-
pose, however. It exists to permit a client to freely and
frankly reveal confidential information, including past
criminal conduct, to the attorney or others whose purpose
is to assist the attorney, and to thereby enable the attor-
ney to adequately represent the client. In a criminal case
the privilege also serves to preserve the defendant's privi-
lege against self incrimination that might otherwise be
deemed to have been waived by his revelation of incrimi-
nating information.67
This explanation of the difference between the attorney-
client privilege and the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
not completely clear. Both privileges result in "prevent[ing]
the use of defendant's statements against him in legal pro-
ceedings."68 Both "prevent the unnecessary disclosure of
statements made in confidence in the course of privileged
communication."69 Both allow a patient or a client to "freely
and frankly reveal confidential information."70 Also, both ex-
ist to allow the attorney or psychotherapist to adequately
counsel the client or patient. 7'
The only distinction of merit lies in the stated purpose of
the attorney-client privilege to protect the client's privilege
against self-incrimination. 2 Such a purpose does not exist in
65. 789 P.2d 127 (Cal. 1990).
66. Id. at 150-53.
67. Id. at 151-52 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 151.
69. Id.
70. People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 151 (Cal. 1990).
71. Id.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating in relevant part: "No person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.").
8351995]
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the psychotherapist-patient privilege. A client's privilege
against self-incrimination, however, is almost never infringed
by an attorney disclosing information to prevent a future
crime.73 Thus, this distinction is not relevant in an analysis
of whether Tarasoff liability should be extended to attorneys.
The court in Clark further explained the basis for its de-
termination: "The Legislature has recognized this distinction
in purpose in Evidence code section 1024, where it provides
that there is no privilege under 'this article,' i.e., article 7,
which contains only the psychotherapist-patient privilege, if
the therapist believes it is necessary to disclose the
communication."
74
Because section 956.5 now corresponds to section 1024,
the distinction has blurred. In enacting section 956.5, the
Legislature has determined that the purposes of the attor-
ney-client privilege are outweighed by public policy to protect
potential crime victims. 75
VI. POLICY ISSUES
Inevitably, a case in which an attorney is sued on a
Tarasoff basis will reach California courts, and there is no
doubt the courts will consider many of the same policy ques-
tions presented in Tarasoff. Many policy issues may be
quickly decided of in favor of extending Tarasoff liability be-
cause these questions are identical to those already consid-
73. See, eg., United States v. Phipps, 600 F.Supp. 830, 831 (Md. 1985);
Philip J. Grib, S.J., A Lawyer's Ethically Justified "Cooperation" in Client Per-
jury, 18 J. LEGAL PROF. 145 (1993); Paul A. Murphy, Use Immunity and the
Fifth Amendment: Maybe the Second Circuit Should Have Remained Silent, 63
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 585 (1989); Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn
Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 451-63
(1990); Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confi-
dences to Prevent Harm, 70 IowA L. REv. 1091, 1106-19 (1985); but see, eg.,
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETMCS 137-39 (1990); Brent
R. Appel, The Limited Effect of Nix v. Whiteside on Attorney-Client Relations,
136 U. PA. L. REv. 1913, 1927-28 (1988); Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confi-
dences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
1939, 1946-55 (1988); Monroe H. Freedman, Are the Model Rules Unconstitu-
tional?, 35 U. MimiM L. REV. 685, 692-93 (1981).
74. Clark, 789 P.2d at 152.
75. This is not a difficult conclusion to accept. The California Legislature
has become increasingly concerned with crime, and has recently passed several
tough crime and sentencing laws. This includes the "three-strikes" sentencing
law for repeat felony offenders-one of the toughest sentencing laws in the
United States.
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ered and decided against psychotherapists in Tarasoff.76
Other issues are unique to the attorney-client relationship
and require serious consideration.
77
Attorneys will argue that free and open communication
is necessary to the legal profession in order to provide compe-
tent representation to clients, and that to impose a duty on
attorneys to disclose any client's confidences will make com-
petent representation impossible. If a client cannot feel com-
pletely free to disclose information to his attorney, the attor-
ney will not be able to obtain enough information to
adequately represent the client. This, some will argue, will
interfere with a client's Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel.78 In Sixth Amendment contexts, as
well as Fifth Amendment contexts,79 the United States
Supreme Court has held that these rights are protected only
to the extent of the traditional attorney-client privilege and
other ethical rules.8 0
The court considered similar arguments by psychothera-
pists in Tarasoff. In Tarasoff, the court concluded that by
creating an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege, the Legislature was in effect saying that these concerns
are not valid when life is on the line.81 Thus, the Legislature
has weighed the need for confidentiality in the psychothera-
pist-patient relationship and decided that it is outweighed by
the concern for public safety.8
2
Furthermore, attorneys will argue that it is unfair to im-
pose civil liability on an attorney for the future acts of a client
76. See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 78-80, 91 and accompanying text.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating in relevant part that "the accused shall
... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
79. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
80. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168 (1986) (holding that the Consti-
tution is not violated if ethics rules are followed); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). There is still an argument to be made that a disclo-
sure of a future crime may create an untenable conflict between attorney and
client which would result in ineffective assistance. The Nix Court rejected a
similar argument. Nix, 475 U.S. at 176. For a discussion of Fifth and Sixth
Amendment considerations on an attorney's disclosure of a future crime, see
Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confi-
dentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 441, 451-63 (1990).
81. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345-47 (Cal. 1976).
82. "We conclude that the public policy favoring protection of the confiden-
tial character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the ex-
tent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others." Id. at 347.
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because it is difficult to determine if a client's threat is seri-
ous. After all, attorneys are not in the business of predicting
behavior, and could not be expected to predict a client's be-
havior with the same exactness as could a psychotherapist.
In Tarasoff, the court quoted hornbook law to the effect
that a professional person must exercise "that reasonable de-
gree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and
exercised by members of (that professional specialty) under
similar circumstances."8 3 Attorneys would thus be held only
to a common sense standard. It is unlikely that attorneys
would be expected to display any special skill in predicting
behavior. On the other hand, an attorney is often in an
unique position to know about the dangerousness of a client.
The attorney often knows much about a client's criminal his-
tory and personality, as well as the facts surrounding the cli-
ent's current case.
A psychotherapist, on the other hand, often knows no
more about a patient than the patient reveals. In fact, the
defendants and amicus curiae argued in Tarasoff that "psy-
chiatric predictions of violence are inherently unreliable."84
The Tarasoff court cited cases from California and other ju-
risdictions where a special relationship was found which cre-
ated a duty to warn a third party.8 5 In each of these cases,
the party with the duty to warn was not specially trained in
behavior prediction.86 The court also cited decisions where
the doctor-patient relationship was found sufficient to sup-
port the duty of reasonable care in protecting others from
dangers emanating from the patient's illness.8 7 In another
cited case, a court held parents liable for not warning a baby-
sitter of the violent proclivities of their child.88 In yet another
case, a state was found to have a duty to warn foster parents
83. Id. at 345.
84. Id. at 354 (concurring opinion).
85. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
87. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344 (Cal. 1976) (citing
Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. App. 1970); Wojcik v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351, 357-58 (N.Y. 1959); Davis v. Rodman, 227
S.W. 612 (Ark. 1921); Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1919); see also
Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928).
88. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 334 (citing Ellis v. D'Angelo, 253 P.2d 675 (Cal.
1953)).
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of the dangerous tendencies of their ward. 9 In a final case, a
court sustained a cause of action against a sheriff who had
promised to warn a third party before releasing a prisoner,
but failed to do so.9"
After the enactment of Evidence Code section 956.5, the
only meritous distinction between the attorney-client privi-
lege and the psychotherapist-patient privilege are the client's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, which have no parallel in
the psychotherapist-patient relationship. As explained
above, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights will almost never
be implicated in protecting a client from the disclosure of a
future crime. 9'
VII. CURRENT DILEMMA
Currently, if an attorney reveals any of her or his client's
"secrets," she or he is in violation of Business and Professions
Code section 6068(e),92 and can be disciplined by the State
Bar for violating the ethical duty to remain silent.93 Techni-
cally, this is true even if the attorney makes the disclosure
pursuant to a court order, even one seemingly authorized by
Evidence Code 956.5. 94 Additionally, clients can maintain
various claims against the attorney for revealing privileged
or ethically protected information. 95 A client could allege a
breach of an express or implied promise to maintain confiden-
tiality,9 6 breach of statutory duty,9 7 invasion of privacy, 98
malpractice, 99 or breach of fiduciary duty.'00
On the other hand, if the attorney does not make a disclo-
sure in order to prevent her or his client from committing a
89. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 344 (citing Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352 (Cal.
1968)).
90. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 344 (citing Morgan v. City of Yuba, 230 Cal. App.
2d 938 (1964)).
91. See supra notes 72-73, 78-80 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
95. See R. MALLEN & J. SMIrrH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 11.5, at 664 (3d ed.
1989); see generally Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM.
L. REv. 1426 (1982) [hereinafter Breach of Confidence].
96. Breach of Confidence, supra note 95 at 1446.
97. Id. at 1447.
98. Id. at 1428-30.
99. See R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 11.5, at 664 (3d ed.
1989).
100. Breach of Confidence, supra note 95, at 1448-49, 1459-60.
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criminal act likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm, the attorney may face a wrongful death claim under a
possible extension of Tarasoff.1° Financial considerations
aside, the attorney must consider the possible harm that
could accrue to an innocent individual as a result of her or his
silence.
VIII. Two PROPOSALS
Sometime shortly before the passage of S.B. 645, a Los
Angeles law firm received a threat from a prospective client
against a judge.102 The firm believed the threat to be credi-
ble.1 13 After extensive consultation, the firm concluded that
it was constrained by Business and Professions Code section
6068(e) from revealing the individual's identity.1 0 4
Had this incident occurred after the passage of S.B. 645,
would the firm have acted differently? Business and Profes-
sions Code section 6068(e) remains unaltered and could still
be interpreted as imposing an ethical duty on the firm to
maintain the client's confidence. However, new Evidence
Code section 956.5 clearly allows disclosure to be compelled
by a court order. 10 5 The firm may now rightfully consider
possible Tarasoff liability should it choose not to disclose and
the client follows through on his threat.
If the firm believes it has an ethical duty to maintain
confidentiality, then no court is likely to become aware that
the client has harmful intentions, and the firm will never be
compelled by a court to reveal the information. Thus, section
956.5 will not aid in preventing the intended harm. This
seems to clearly circumvent the intentions of the Legisla-
ture.1 0 6 The only way for the legislative intent to be realized
is to recognize an exception to the attorney's duty of confiden-
tiality. The courts may do this on their own, but this is cer-
tainly not a given. In order to alleviate this confusion, the
Legislature should adopt an exception to Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 6068(e), allowing non-court-compelled
101. Compare Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal.
1976).
102. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM. REPORT FOR 1993 CALIFORNIA
SENATE BILL 645, 1993-94 Regular Sess., at 16 (Aug. 18, 1993).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 102.
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disclosure whenever there is not a privilege under Evidence
Code section 956.5. This proposal would eliminate the cur-
rent conflict between Evidence Code 956.5 and Business and
Professions Code section 6068(e), by allowing the attorney a
choice. The attorney would choose whether or not to disclose
information that might prevent a client from committing the
threatened act, thereby avoiding potential Tarasoff liability.
An even better exception to Business and Professions
Code section 6068(e) would allow voluntary disclosure of "any
necessary information, when the attorney reasonably be-
lieves that disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act
that the attorney believes is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm." This proposal would allow
a disclosure different in three respects from that contem-
plated in section 956.5. First, it would not limit the disclo-
sure to "confidential communication" as defined by Evidence
Code section 952.107 Since section 6068(e) protects all of the
client's "secrets," regardless of whether they meet the defini-
tion of "confidential communication," the attorney should be
free to disclose "any necessary information" in the interest of
public safety.108 Second, the disclosable information would
not be limited to those situations necessary to prevent the cli-
ent from committing a criminal act. The attorney would be
able to disclose confidential information to prevent third
party criminal acts. The interest in public safety is no more
implicated in a case where the client is about to commit the
anticipated harm than in a case where a third party is about
to commit the harm.10 9 Finally, there would be no exception
107. See supra note 30.
108. An example should make this distinction clear. Suppose Attorney rep-
resents Client on a robbery charge. Client's Mother, a reliable source, informs
Attorney that Client has purchased a weapon and intends to kill Client's rob-
bery victim in order to prevent Victim from testifying against Client at trial. In
this case, the information would not be protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege, because the information was not obtained through a "confidential commu-
nication between client and lawyer" as required by Evidence Code section 952.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text. However, this information is still a
"secret" of the client and is protected by Business and Professions Code section
6068(e). See supra note 24 and accompanying text. If Attorney is able to form a
reasonable belief that disclosure is necessary to prevent Client from killing Vic-
tim, Attorney should be able to disclose. The public safety interest is the same
regardless of the source of the information.
109. For example, Client informs Attorney that Client's Brother is about to
kill Victim. If Client does not consent to disclosure of this information, it would
be protected by both the attorney-client privilege and the attorney's ethical
1995]
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to the attorney's duty of confidentiality unless the threatened
harm was "imminent." Because the first two differences ex-
pand the scope of permissible disclosures from that of section
956.5, this difference would prevent uncompelled disclosure
when the anticipated harm is too speculative to outweigh the
client's interest in confidentiality. 110
The second, and preferred proposal would create a solu-
tion to another related problem. Once the attorney decides
that disclosure is necessary to prevent the criminal act, the
questions are how much information does the attorney re-
veal, and to whom? The attorney may disclose only "any nec-
essary information, when the attorney reasonably believes
that disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the
attorney believes is likely to result in imminent death or sub-
stantial bodily harm."1 The attorney must therefore mini-
mize the disclosure to what is needed to prevent the harm,
without unnecessarily compromising the client's interest in
confidentiality. The attorney could, therefore, disclose infor-
mation without disclosing his clients identity, if unnecessary.
The attorney could also reasonably decide whether it is neces-
sary to inform the police, the victim, a third party, or per-
haps some combination of these. This gives the attorney flex-
ibility to prevent the intended harm, to minimize the loss of
confidentiality, and to avoid Tarasoff liability. 1 2
duty of confidentiality. This example would not even fall under the exception of
Evidence Code section 956.5, because the contemplated criminal act is not to be
committed by the client. Again, the public safety interest is the same regard-
less of who is about to do the killing, and the attorney should be able to disclose.
My proposal would create a situation in this case where the communication
would remain privileged, but would not be ethically protected. Following the
rule in Kleinfield v. State, the communication would remain privileged despite
the disclosure. Kleinfield v. State, 568 So. 2d 937 (Fla. App. 1990); see also
supra note 16 and accompanying text. This would allow the disclosure in order
to prevent the anticipated crime, but would not allow Brother's anticipated
criminal act to compromise the legal position of Client.
110. One could imagine a situation where Mother tells Attorney that Neigh-
bor plans to kill Client's Victim on some date far in the future. Because such a
threat may never materialize, and may be preventable without disclosure, Cli-
ent's interests in confidentiality outweigh the public safety interest. Attorney
may still take steps to prevent the harm if it does not result in disclosure of
Client's secrets. Eventually, if the anticipated harm becomes imminent, Attor-
ney may disclose.
111. CAL. EvD. CODE § 956.5 (Deering Supp. 1995).
112. Using the example in supra note 108, Attorney may decide to disclose to
Mother, believing that disclosure is all that is necessary to prevent Client from
killing Victim. Alternatively, Attorney may warn Victim and/or police without
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IX. CONCLUSION
It is still unclear whether California attorneys may, on
their own initiative, disclose confidential information when
they reasonably believe disclosure is necessary to prevent a
client from committing a criminal act that is likely to result
in death or substantial bodily harm. Presently, if the attor-
ney discloses, she or he may be subject to State Bar discipline
for violating Business and Professions Code section 6068(e),
or she or he may be subject to a number of civil actions by the
client. On the other hand, if the attorney maintains confi-
dence, she or he may be subjected to Tarasoff liability, and
she or he may allow an innocent individual to suffer serious
harm. Until this issue is clearly resolved by the California
courts or legislature, attorneys will continue to face this ethi-
cal and economic dilemma.
disclosing Client's identity. Attorney could then tell Client that the police and
Victim have been alerted, hoping that this would dissuade Client from carrying
out his plans. Finally, Attorney could make a complete disclosure to the police,
including Client's identity and the specifics of Client's plans, if Attorney reason-
ably believes the disclosure is necessary to prevent the intended harm.
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